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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Suppose the United States Supreme Court treated itself to a visit 
to the National Gallery of Art. One doubts whether the Justices 
would be able to fully appreciate the artwork. In particular, imagine 
the members of the Court observing the paintings of Georges Seurat, 
the Post-Impressionist who created controversy by inventing “Divi-
sionism,” a method sometimes called “Pointillism.”1 In his paintings, 
Seurat meticulously juxtaposed “minute touches of unmixed pig-
ments,”2 relying on the mechanism of sight itself 3 to cause the 
viewer’s eye to combine the different colors into a whole “when 
viewed at the proper distance.”4 Thus, in placing each individual 
speck of paint on the canvas, Seurat intended that his audience 
                                                                                                                  
 * Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, California State University Fullerton; 
former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los 
Angeles, 1987; B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 1983. 
 1. THAMES AND HUDSON, IMPRESSIONIST AND POST-IMPRESSIONIST MASTERPIECES AT 
THE MUSEE D’ORSEY 172 (1986). The National Gallery of Art Web Page, at http://www. 
nga.gov/cgi-bin/printo?Object-6111/+0+none [hereinafter The National Gallery of Art]. 
 2. The National Gallery of Art, supra note 1, at 1. 
 3. See THAMES AND HUDSON, supra note 1, at 172. 
 4. The National Gallery of Art, supra note 1, at 1. 
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would see the bigger picture.5 Yet, the current Court might foil 
Seurat’s best plans. Indeed, it seems that Justice Clarence Thomas 
would lead a majority of the Court right up to a Seurat painting, 
such as The Lighthouse at Honfleur, with a magnifying glass, and 
say, “That one dot is pink!”6 Apparently, four other Justices, huddled 
near the painting, would nod in agreement, missing the overall pic-
ture of a landscape of the beach.7 
 The Supreme Court likewise missed the big picture presented by 
the Fourth Amendment8 when it rendered its decision in Florida v. 
White.9 Five members of the Court focused almost exclusively on one 
speck of constitutional jurisprudence, the automobile exception, thus 
missing the larger rule of the Fourth Amendment itself. Justice 
Thomas, who delivered the Court’s opinion in White, ruled that once 
a vehicle is deemed to be “contraband,” it is vulnerable to immediate 
warrantless seizure, for an indefinite period of time, under the auto-
mobile exception.10 Thus, White elevated the automobile exception to 
such high status that it outranks the Fourth Amendment mainstays 
of the timeliness of probable cause and the Warrant Clause11 itself. 
 Much like Georges Seurat, the Framers created the Fourth 
Amendment realizing that each of its intricate parts affected the 
whole. Searches and seizures are to be moderated by reasonableness, 
police are to be checked by neutral magistrates, and warrants are to 
be supported by probable cause.12 As members of the Court itself 
have previously acknowledged, each of these elements weighs in a 
delicate balance of government interests against those of the individ-
ual.13 Yet, the Court in White, by focusing on one dot of law, obscured 
                                                                                                                  
 5. The eye itself naturally makes this synthesis by “mingling [the colors] upon the 
retina.” THAMES AND HUDSON, supra note 1, at 172. 
 6. Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 
(1999). 
 7. The other Justices joining the majority opinion in White included Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony M. 
Kennedy. 
 8. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. 526 U.S. 559 (1999). 
 10. Id. at 564-65. 
 11. See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV (stating that “no warrant shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized”). 
 12. See id. 
 13. In three opinions, Justices Lewis F. Powell Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and Felix 
Frankfurter have observed that “[w]hile the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of free-
dom from unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of 
most [searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of the 
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the overall scene. Thus, in repeatedly tugging at one stitch, White 
threatened to unravel the entire tapestry of the Fourth Amendment. 
 This Article begins in Part II with a review of the history of the 
warrant preference and the creation and evolution of the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement. Part III presents White, its 
factual background, lower court rulings, and the Supreme Court’s de-
cision. Finally, Part IV critically examines White’s analysis and dis-
cusses its potential negative impact on Fourth Amendment protec-
tions. 
II.   THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S WARRANT MANDATE AND THE 
CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF ITS AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION 
A.   The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Preference 
 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and sei-
zures, but only those deemed “unreasonable.”14 Determining the pre-
cise meaning of reasonableness has been an elusive goal,15 for the 
Amendment itself is subject to two contrasting interpretations. 16 The 
two approaches to “reasonableness” are based on the Fourth 
Amendment’s two clauses: the Reasonableness Clause and the War-
rant Clause. The Reasonableness Clause provides as follows: “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated.”17 The Warrant Clause then provides as follows: “No Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.”18 
                                                                                                                  
Amendment balanced the interests involved.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 
(1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983)); see also Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. 730, 744-45 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 
56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice Blackmun em-
phasized the importance of the Framers’ original balancing of interests, cautioning that 
only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement, make the warrant- and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a 
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) 
(stating that what the “Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreaso n-
able searches and seizures”).  
 15. In Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63 (1949), the Court lamented that “[w]hat is a reaso n-
able search is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define 
what are ‘unreasonable’ searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready lit-
mus paper test." 
 16. The Rabinowitz majority provided the view that reasonableness was not subject to 
any “fixed formula,” but instead “must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of 
each case.” Id. In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter presented the opposing view, arguing 
that reasonableness was determined with reference to the Warrant Clause. See id. at 70 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. Id. 
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 Some Justices of the Supreme Court have interpreted the Reason-
ableness Clause as standing alone, defining reasonableness without 
reference to the requirements specified in the Warrant Clause.19 
However, for most of the twentieth century, and now entering into 
the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has considered the War-
rant Clause as predominant, defining what was needed for a gov-
ernment intrusion to be considered reasonable.20 The current Chief 
Justice has recognized the consensus of the Court that the warrant 
mandate defines reasonableness:  
 The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness. In construing this command, there has been gen-
eral agreement that “except in certain carefully defined classes of 
cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘un-
reasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant.”21 
 Another member of the current Court, Justice Stevens, has even 
termed the warrant preference as “settled law.”22 In doing so, Justice 
Stevens quoted the following passage from the seminal case, Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire: 
“The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.’ The exceptions are ‘jealously and care-
fully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek ex-
emption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative.’ The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show 
the need for it.”23 
The first automobile exception case, Carroll v. United States,24 proved 
Coolidge’s point, for the automobile exception was so named because 
                                                                                                                  
 19. “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the 
constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’” Vernonia School District 
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). 
 20. In Chimel v. California, the Court expressed concern about a reasonableness 
standard lacking the guidance of the Warrant Clause:  
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of rea-
son. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to 
say that an ‘unreasonable search’ is forbidden—that the search must be rea-
sonable. What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable? 
395 U.S. 752, 765 (1968) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).  
 21. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). 
 22. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 568 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453, 454-55 (1971)). 
 24. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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it served as an exception to the requirement that a warrant precede a 
police search.25 
 Further, automobile exception jurisprudence not only continued to 
acknowledge the warrant preference, but also raised it to a “cardinal 
principle.”26 This principle had very pragmatic results. Since a war-
rantless search was presumed “per se unreasonable . . . subject only 
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,”27 the 
burden was on the government to prove any search without a war-
rant was reasonable. Thus, it behooved police to strictly adhere to the 
specified elements of any warrant exception, including the automo-
bile exception. 
B.   Carroll’s Common Sense Belief That Mobility Created an 
Exigency for the Automobile Exception 
 In its interpretation of the automobile exception’s place in search 
and seizure jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has explicitly noted 
the importance of construing the Fourth Amendment as it was un-
derstood at the time of its adoption.28 In White itself, Justice Thomas, 
who authored the Court’s opinion, intoned that “[i]n deciding 
whether a challenged governmental action violates the Amendment, 
we have taken care to inquire whether the action was regarded as an 
unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment was framed.”29 
 The White Court then went on to cite Carroll as a proper example 
of the Court’s adherence to original intent.30 Carroll was a bootleg-
ging case in which George Carroll and John Kiro were convicted of 
transporting sixty-eight quarts of whiskey and gin in an Oldsmobile 
Roadster, in violation of the National Prohibition Act31.32 After form-
ing probable cause that Carroll’s car contained contraband liquor,33 
but before obtaining a warrant, agents stopped and searched the 
roadster, finding the sixty-eight bottles of alcohol “behind the uphol-
stering of the seats.”34 While Carroll contended that the search vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment,35 the Court ultimately ruled that the 
search was proper.36 
                                                                                                                  
 25. Id. 
 26. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
 27. Id.  
 28. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999). 
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. 
 31. Ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933).  
 32. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-35 (1925).  
 33. See id. at 162. 
 34. Id. at 135. 
 35. See id. at 134. 
 36. See id. at 162. 
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 White boasted that Carroll’s holding “was rooted in federal law en-
forcement practice at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”37 Carroll’s faithfulness to the Founders was demonstrated by 
that Court’s examination of “laws of the First, Second, and Fourth 
Congresses that authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless 
searches of ships and to seize concealed goods subject to duties.”38 
White’s explicit mandate to honor the Framers’ intent thus invites 
anyone interested in understanding the Court’s opinion to return to 
Carroll, the case that created the automobile exception in Fourth 
Amendment case law by studying the Congresses of the Founders. 
An exploration of Carroll will not only aid in assessing White’s hold-
ing and its implications, but will also provide a yardstick by which to 
measure the Court’s own efforts at effectuating the original aims of 
the Fourth Amendment’s creators. 
 The Carroll Court’s concern with the Framers’ intent permeates 
its reasoning. Chief Justice Taft, who authored the Carroll opinion, 
closely examined “[t]he first statute passed by Congress to regulate 
the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789.”39 Carroll surmised 
that review of the act of 1789 cast light on the Framers’ view of 
Fourth Amendment rights, “[T]his act was passed by the same Con-
gress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the 
Constitution . . . .”40 
 Specifically, the detailed examination of this law enabled Carroll 
to determine the scope and underpinnings of the warrant preference. 
The Chief Justice noted a distinction between the searches of vehi-
cles of transportation, such as a “ship or vessel,” and such fixed 
structures as a “dwelling-house, store, [or] building.”41 The Duties 
Act of 1789 enabled collectors to enter and search the vessels upon 
mere “reason to suspect,” while it authorized the search of structures 
only if the reason to suspect was bolstered by a warrant.42 Thus, Car-
roll concluded that the first Congresses made a distinction “as to the 
necessity for a search warrant” between items concealed in “a dwell-
ing house or similar place,” and similar objects discovered “in course 
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they read-
ily could be put out of reach of a search warrant.”43 Essentially, offi-
cials should obtain prior approval by a judge whenever practically 
possible, such as in cases involving fixed structures. The warrant 
                                                                                                                  
 37. Florida v. White,526 U.S. 559, 559 (1999). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 150-51. 
 42. Id. (citing the statute). 
 43. Id.  at 151. 
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mandate would not be required when following it would prove impos-
sible.44 
 This point was so important to the creation of the automobile ex-
ception that the Court reiterated it only two pages later in its opin-
ion: 
 We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes 
to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, prac-
tically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a 
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or 
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily 
may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or 
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to se-
cure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.45 
Therefore, the automobile exception was a child of necessity and exi-
gency; when possessing probable cause, police were allowed to search 
vehicles without a warrant because a warrant requirement would 
simply be unworkable. Further, the unworkability was not mere in-
convenience, but impossibility. Chief Justice Taft ruled: 
 In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practica-
ble, it must be used, and when properly supported by affidavit and 
issued after judicial approval protects the seizing officer against a 
suit for damages. In cases where seizure is impossible except with-
out warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril 
unless he can show the court probable cause.46 
 Therefore, as White proudly noted, Carroll did adhere to original 
intent. Unfortunately for the White Court, Carroll’s obedience to the 
Framers pointed it in a direction that differed markedly from White’s 
analysis. Carroll’s painstaking review of the actions of the first Con-
gresses caused Chief Justice William Howard Taft to reassert the 
warrant’s role in Fourth Amendment litigation and to make only a 
narrow exception to the warrant mandate. Further, this exception 
was fully supported by common sense recognition of the exigencies 
caused by mobile vehicles. Carroll’s simple distinction between fixed 
buildings and moving motorcars was so persuasive that it was still 
relied upon nearly forty years later. In Preston v. United States,47 the 
Court reiterated Carroll’s exigency requirement:  
Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving 
searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be 
                                                                                                                  
 44. See id. at 156. 
 45. Id. at 153. 
 46. Id. at 156. 
 47. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). 
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treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed 
structures like houses. For this reason, what may be an unreason-
able search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motor-
car.48 
C.   Chambers’ Strained Logic in Equating Seizure and Search 
of a Vehicle 
 In 1970, in Chambers v. Maroney,49 Carroll’s decades-old exigency 
requirement was unceremoniously dumped.50 Chambers involved an 
armed robbery of a service station of currency and coins by men who 
drove away in a blue compact station wagon.51 Within an hour of the 
robbery and some two miles from the service station, police spotted a 
station wagon answering the description of the suspect vehicle.52 The 
facts in the case supported probable cause to immediately search the 
station wagon in the field for evidence of the robbery.53 However, po-
lice chose to forgo an immediate search in favor of driving the car to 
the station.54 The stationhouse search of the car revealed guns and 
evidence linking the station wagon to the service station robbery.55 
The Court in Chambers ultimately upheld the delayed search under 
the automobile exception, thus ending any need for exigent circum-
stances. 56 
 Chambers’ elimination of the automobile exception’s exigency 
prong was not based on adherence to the Framers’ intent but to a 
single paragraph of illogic. Faced with a search of a car after it had 
been taken into the sole custody of police at the stationhouse,57 the 
Chambers Court performed intellectual contortions to uphold the of-
ficial intrusion. Justice White, writing the majority opinion, first paid 
lip service to the Warrant Clause’s predominance by noting that 
“[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s judgment, 
only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search 
warrant is obtained.”58 This was because only the seizure, or “lesser” 
intrusion, is permissible until a magistrate authorizes the search, or 
“greater” intrusion.59 Then, without reference to any specifics, the 
Chambers Court equated the “lesser” and “greater” intrusions by 
                                                                                                                  
 48. Id. at 366-67. 
 49. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
 50. Id. at 51-52. 
 51. See id. at 44. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 52. 
 54. See id. at 44. 
 55. See id.  at 44-45. 
 56. See id. at 51-52. 
 57. See id. at 44. 
 58. Id. at 51. 
 59. Id.  
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finding “no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a 
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on 
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a war-
rant.”60 Hence, under the automobile exception, the more intrusive 
search is to be treated the same, “for constitutional purposes,” as the 
less intrusive seizure.61 Justice White’s likening of more with less en-
abled the Chambers Court to extend the automobile exception from 
searches in the field to those at the station when the car is already 
safely within police custody.62 
 Chambers gained credibility by receiving the respected patina 
that comes with being cited as precedent. In 1975, Texas v. White,63 a 
per curiam opinion, explicitly reaffirmed Chambers.64 In Texas v. 
White, police arrested the defendant for attempting to pass fraudu-
lent checks at a bank’s drive-in window in Amarillo.65 While one offi-
cer drove the defendant to the police station, the other drove his car 
to the station house.66 Later, a search of the defendant’s vehicle at 
the station recovered four other checks that he had tried to pass at 
another bank.67 Despite the lack of any facts pointing to exigency, the 
Texas v. White Court found the search reasonable: 
 In Chambers v. Maroney we held that police officers with prob-
able cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was 
stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house 
without first obtaining a warrant. There, as here, “[t]he probable-
cause factor” that developed at the scene “still obtained at the sta-
tion house.”68 
 In still another per curiam opinion, Michigan v. Thomas,69 the 
Court again relied upon Chambers to rule that “officers may conduct 
a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded 
and is in police custody.”70 To remove any doubt about Chambers’ vi-
tality, the Thomas opinion noted that it “firmly reiterated this hold-
ing in Texas v. White.”71 Further, the Thomas Court took the extra 
step of specifically rejecting various scenarios of exigency as limits on 
the Chambers rule. Thomas urged: 
                                                                                                                  
 60. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52. 
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. at 52. 
 63. 423 U.S. 67 (1975). 
 64. Id. at 68. 
 65. Id. at 67. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. at 68 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). 
 69. 458 U.S. 529 (1982).  
 70. Id. at 261. 
 71. Id.  
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It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless 
search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does 
it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in 
each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or 
that its contents would have been tampered with, during the pe-
riod required for the police to obtain a warrant.72 
 Chambers became even more firmly established in the 1984 per 
curiam opinion, Florida v. Meyers.73 In Meyers the Court not only re-
affirmed Chambers, but also Chambers’ progeny, Thomas.74 Further, 
this opinion even contained an air of irritation at any court failing to 
grasp the import of Chambers. Indeed, Meyers found fault with the 
District Court of Appeal in that case because it “either misunder-
stood or ignored our prior rulings with respect to the constitutional-
ity of the warrantless search of an impounded automobile.”75 Thus, 
three opinions, all of which might have lacked the benefit of full 
briefing and argument,76 and none of which divined the Framers’ in-
tent, enabled the Court to establish, as firmly entrenched, a rule that 
created a curious break with Carroll’s formulation of the automobile 
exception. 
 The Court did rely on Chambers in one fully briefed case, United 
States v. Ross.77 Yet, the Ross Court only employed Chambers to sup-
port the scope of an automobile exception search in terms of place, 
and not of time. In Ross, upon probable cause, police searched two 
containers found in the defendant’s car, a “’lunch-type’ brown paper 
bag,” and a “red leather pouch.”78 The heroin found in the bag and 
the currency found in the pouch were later introduced at trial to con-
vict the defendant of possession of heroin with the intent to distrib-
ute.79 When the Ross Court analyzed Chambers, it used Chambers’  
permissible search under the car’s dashboard as support to allow the 
search of the two containers, the bag, and the pouch.80 
                                                                                                                  
 72. Id.  
 73. 466 U.S. 380 (1984). 
 74. See id. at 382. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Per curiam opinions do not receive the same treatment accorded traditional opin-
ions. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), Justice Stevens noted this limitation 
in a per curiam opinion: “I respectfully dissent from the grant of certiorari and from the 
decision on the merits without full argument and briefing.” Id. at 124.  
 77. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).  
 78. Id. at 801. 
 79. See id.  
 80. See id. at 818. Ross opined: 
 In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and stolen property “con-
cealed in a compartment under the dashboard.” No suggestion was made that 
the scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical to assume that 
the outcome of Chambers . . . would have been different if the police had found 
the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary container and had opened 
that container without a warrant. . . . [I]f it was reasonable to open the con-
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 Chambers, the case permitting warrantless searches of cars after 
they were no longer in danger of being moved, ultimately did receive 
its analytical fig leaf. The case which perhaps best explained the 
shift in the automobile exception’s logical foundations was California 
v. Carney.81 In Carney, police searched the defendant’s motor home 
after obtaining probable cause that he was using it as a site to ex-
change “marihuana for sex.”82 The search recovered marijuana on the 
motor home’s table, in the cupboards, and in the refrigerator.83 Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Carney Court, traced the 
automobile exception back to Carroll.84 The Chief Justice noted that 
Carroll “recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are 
constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of 
the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those inter-
ests.”85 Yet, the Court in Carney added a new rationale for the auto-
mobile exception: 
However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original 
justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made 
clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception. 
The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said, are twofold. 
“Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant require-
ments govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to 
one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s 
home or office.”86 
 However, perhaps much to Justice Thomas’ consternation, the fac-
tors bolstering the second, “lessened expectation of privacy in cars” 
rationale bore little connection to anything the Founders might have 
imagined. To explain the lessened privacy expectations of motorists, 
the Chief Justice offered: 
“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and con-
tinuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic 
inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, 
police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection 
stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes 
or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety 
equipment are not in proper working order.”87 
                                                                                                                  
cealed compartment in Chambers, it would have been equally reasonable to 
open a paper bag crumpled within it. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 81. 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
 82. Id. at 388. 
 83. See id.  
 84. See id. at 390. 
 85. Id. Chief Justice Burger also noted that “[t]he capacity to be ‘quickly moved’ was 
clearly the basis of the holding in Carroll.” Id.  
 86. Id. at 391 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 87. Id. at 392 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)). 
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 Thus, later opinions attempted to fill in the gaps in logic left by 
Chambers’ abrupt shift away from the exigency rationale. The Court 
seemed intent on obscuring its drift away from Carroll with repeated 
citations of Chambers’ holding and by the reference to “later cases” 
creation of a new “lesser expectations of privacy” rationale.88 Such 
tactics could not hide the Court’s plain break with the Framers’ in-
tent as manifested in Carroll. 
D.   Johns’ Unexplained Extension of the Duration of Law 
Enforcement’s Right to Search Impounded Vehicles 
 Perhaps the Court itself was uncomfortable with Chambers’  at-
tempt to explain away the automobile exception’s exigency require-
ment for, in United States v. Johns,89 the Court chose instead to sim-
ply avoid any explanation. In Johns, federal agents in Arizona ob-
served what appeared to be drug smuggling, about fifty miles from 
the Mexican border. Agents inferred that small aircraft had landed 
on remote airstrips to supply pickup trucks with plastic packages full 
of marijuana.90 Instead of searching the trucks at the desert airstrip, 
the marijuana packages were taken to a Drug Enforcement Agency 
warehouse and searched without a warrant three days later.91 Upon 
certiorari, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the 
“delay after the initial seizure made the subsequent warrantless 
search unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”92 
 The Johns majority not only avoided providing a rationale to ex-
plain the reasonableness of a delayed search, but it appeared to be 
engaged in an exercise of telling the reader what it would not dis-
cuss. Although Justice O’Connor, the author of the Court’s opinion in 
Johns, acknowledged that the three-day delay of the search of the 
impounded trucks was the “central issue” in the case,93 she repeat-
edly refused to announce a rule specifically addressing it. Initially, 
Johns merely repeated earlier case law that the “justification to con-
duct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been 
immobilized,”94 and that, with the automobile exception, “there is no 
requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless 
search.”95 However, the Johns Court offered no rationale to support a 
delay as long as three days. Instead, Justice O’Connor relied on Ross’ 
                                                                                                                  
 88. Id. at 391. 
 89. 469 U.S. 478 (1985).  
 90. See id. at 480. 
 91. See id. at 481. 
 92. Id. at 480. 
 93. Id. at 483. 
 94. Id. at 484 (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982)). 
 95. Id. (quoting Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984)). 
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failure to establish “temporal restrictions” to the automobile excep-
tion in upholding the delayed search in Johns.96 
 Yet, Johns also refused to state a rule placing an outer time limit 
on automobile exception searches. Justice O’Connor cautioned: 
 We do not suggest that police officers may indefinitely retain 
possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a ve-
hicle search. Nor do we foreclose the possibility that the owner of a 
vehicle or its contents might attempt to prove that delay in the 
completion of a vehicle search was unreasonable because it ad-
versely affected a privacy or possessory interest.97 
Thus, in the case extending the automobile exception’s time limits to 
a matter of days rather than hours, the only clear declarations dealt 
with the decisions the Court refused to make. 
 The Court would again announce the automobile exception’s lack 
of need for exigent circumstances, perhaps fittingly, in two more per 
curiam opinions, Pennsylvania v. Labron98 and Maryland v. Dyson.99 
Labron actually involved two cases, Labron and Kilgore. In Labron, 
police arrested Edwin Labron after watching him engage in a “series 
of drug transactions on a street in Philadelphia.”100 After arrest, po-
lice searched the trunk of “a car from which the drugs had been pro-
duced,” recovering cocaine.101 Kilgore’s facts were almost as simple: 
an undercover informant connected Randy Kilgore’s truck to a drug 
sale, which resulted in police recovering cocaine from the truck’s 
floor. In both Labron and Kilgore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
found exigent circumstances to be a necessary automobile exception 
element. 102 In Labron, the Court deemed the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s exigency requirement to be “incorrect,” ruling that “[i]f a car 
is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains con-
traband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the 
vehicle without more.”103 
 In Dyson, a case in which the Court described the facts as “virtu-
ally identical” to those in Labron, the Court reached a similar re-
                                                                                                                  
 96. Id. at 485. Justice O’Connor wrote: 
Ross, as the Court of Appeals noted, did observe in a footnote that if police may 
immediately search a vehicle on the street without a warrant, “a search soon 
thereafter at the police station is permitted if the vehicle is impounded.” When 
read in context, these remarks plainly do not suggest that searches of contain-
ers discovered in the course of a vehicle search are subject to temporal restric-
tions not applicable to the vehicle search itself. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 97. Johns, 469 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 98. 518 U.S. 938 (1996). 
 99. 527 U.S. 465 (1999).  
 100. Labron, 518 U.S. at 939. 
 101. Id.  
 102. See id.  
 103. Id. at 940. 
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sult. 104 Dyson involved a sheriff deputy’s vehicular search based on 
an informant’s tip.105 At 11 a.m. on July 2, 1996, the deputy learned 
from a “reliable confidential informant” that Kevin Dyson had driven 
to New York to buy drugs and would return in a particular red Toy-
ota with “a large quantity of cocaine.”106 After corroborating the tip-
ster’s information by learning that Dyson was a “known drug dealer” 
in the county, the deputy then stopped and searched his car at 1 
a.m., on July 3, 1996.107 The Court in Dyson found this search to be 
within the automobile exception, despite the fact that the deputy had 
several hours in which to obtain a warrant. 108 Indeed, Dyson explic-
itly stated, “the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency re-
quirement.”109 Thus, in the same term that the Court decided White, 
the Court in Dyson destroyed any remnant of Carroll’s exigency re-
quirement. 
II.   FLORIDA V. WHITE 
A.   Facts 
 The facts are short, but not simple. At some time during the 
months of July and August 1993,110 police observed Tyvessel Tyvorus 
White “using his car to deliver cocaine, and thereby developed prob-
able cause to believe that his car was subject to forfeiture under the 
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.”111 Presumably, the facts which 
                                                                                                                  
 104. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999). 
 105. See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 465. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 466. 
 108. See id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Perhaps because of law enforcement’s failure to immediately act upon this infor-
mation and arrest White, there is no clear record of the dates of police observations of 
defendant’s activities. See White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949, 950 n.2 (Fla. 1998). Regarding 
the lack of certainty as to the dates, the Florida Supreme Court noted: 
The dates of the alleged prior illegal activities were July 26, 1993, and August 4 
and 7, 1993. We commend the State’s candor in providing these dates during 
oral argument. As both parties noted at oral argument, the record is unclear as 
to the actual dates. The State noted that these dates are contained in White’s 
motion for post conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.850. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 561 (1999). Florida’s Contraband Forfeiture Act 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal property, 
or real property used in violation of any provision of the Florida Contraband 
Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken place, may be seized and shall be for-
feited. 
FLA.  STAT. § 932.703(1)(a) (2000). Th e Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to 
simply mean that “certain forms of contraband, including motor vehicles used in violation 
of the Act’s provisions, may be seized and potentially forfeited.” White, 526 U.S. at 561. 
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supported the probable cause for the forfeiture would have also suf-
ficed to support an arrest of White. Therefore, Florida’s police could 
have both arrested White and seized his car. However, “[f]or reasons 
unexplained,” police chose to do neither.112 
 Instead, police allowed months to pass until they arrested White, 
at his place of employment, on an unrelated matter.113 Police officers 
had determined just before the arrest that they would seize White’s 
car under the state’s forfeiture act. 114 Accordingly, once police had 
taken White into custody on the unrelated charges, they secured the 
car’s keys and seized it “from the parking lot of White’s employ-
ment.”115 The seizure of White’s car was not incident to his arrest or 
by warrant.116 The sole basis for the seizure was because the police 
decided that the car was forfeitable under Florida’s forfeiture act. 117 
 Once the car was seized and moved to the Bay County Joint Nar-
cotics Task Force headquarters, it became subject to a “routine in-
ventory search,” which revealed two pieces of crack cocaine.118 When 
White later moved to suppress this cocaine, the trial court reserved 
ruling on the issue, letting the evidence go to the jury.119 Then, at a 
post-conviction suppression hearing, the trial court denied the defen-
dant’s motion.120  
B.   Lower Court Rulings 
 White appealed to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.121 However, its holding was 
hardly an endorsement for the notion that the automobile exception 
supported the seizure of White’s vehicle. Indeed, the First District 
Court treated the automobile exception as, at most, a fallback argu-
ment, which it considered in a single paragraph.122  
 Judge William A. Van Nortwick, who authored the First District 
Court opinion, initially focused on whether the seizure properly fol-
lowed the state statute.123 When it finally considered the seizure’s 
Fourth Amendment implications, the First District Court of Appeal 
turned to the federal circuits for guidance, noting that these courts 
                                                                                                                  
 112. White, 526 U.S. at 567 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 113. See id. at 561. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida carefully noted: “The 
charges on which White was arrested are not the subject of the instant appeal.” White v. 
State, 680 So. 2d 550, 551 n.2. (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). 
 114. See White v. State , 680 So. 2d at 551. 
 115. White v. State, 710 So. 2d. 949, 950 (Fla. 1998). 
 116. See id.  
 117. See White, 526 U.S. at 562. 
 118. White, 680 So. 2d. at 551. 
 119. See id. at 552. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 557. 
 122. See id. at 554-55. 
 123. See id. at 552-53. 
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were split on the issue.124 Judge Van Nortwick essentially chose to 
fall in with the majority and held that “a warrantless seizure of a 
motor vehicle based on probable cause that the vehicle was used in 
violation of the Forfeiture Act does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.”125 
 In offering reasoning to support its holding, the court did not rush 
to employ the automobile exception. Instead, Judge Van Nortwick 
adhered to, as the court’s preferred rationale, an argument stemming 
from law enforcement’s right to perform warrantless arrests. The 
court found the following reasoning as convincing: 
“If federal law enforcement agents, armed with probable cause, 
can arrest a drug trafficker without repairing to the magistrate for 
a warrant, we see no reason why they should not also be permitted 
to seize the vehicle the trafficker has been using to transport his 
drugs. Appellants would have us accord the trafficker’s property 
interest greater deference than his liberty interest; they seem to 
suggest that the injury caused by erroneous detention . . . is some-
how greater in the case of one’s property than it is in the case of 
one’s liberty. We are not persuaded.”126 
 Almost as an afterthought, Judge Van Nortwick mentioned the 
“so-called ‘automobile exception.’”127 White v. State noted the two rea-
sons advanced for the automobile exception: 1) vehicle mobility and 
2) the lessened privacy expectations with respect to automobiles. 128 
Judge Van Nortwick then recognized that “a warrantless search and 
seizure of a motor vehicle may pass constitutional scrutiny absent 
any exigent circumstances other than the characteristics inherent in 
a motor vehicle.”129 He therefore found it logical to use the “same rea-
sons” of mobility and lessened privacy to allow a vehicle seizure “un-
der a forfeiture statute without a prior warrant.”130 
 In its automobile exception discussion, the First District Court of 
Florida took great pains to avoid simply stating that the seizure of 
White’s car fell within the automobile exception. Instead, it only in-
tended to use the automobile exception as an analogy. Like cars 
seized under the automobile exception, cars seized by the forfeiture 
laws are both mobile and have a lessened expectation of privacy. 
Thus, like cars subject to the automobile exception, cars subject to 
forfeiture statutes can be seized without a warrant.  
                                                                                                                  
 124. See id. at 553. 
 125. Id. at 554. 
 126. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 127. Id. at 554. 
 128. Id. at 554. 
 129. Id. at 554-55. 
 130. Id. at 555. 
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 The fact that White v. State was careful not to rely on the automo-
bile exception as precedent, squarely deciding the seizure under the 
forfeiture issue, indicates that the District Court determined that it 
was not directly relevant. This is further borne out by Judge Van 
Nortwick’s reliance on “logic,”131 grounds not nearly as strong as prior 
case law. 
 When, at the Florida Supreme Court, the automobile exception ra-
tionale was placed squarely at issue, it did not fare well.132 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Harry Lee An-
stead, hearkened back to a view of the automobile exception articu-
lated by Carroll—an indication of concern for the intentions of the 
Fourth Amendment’s Framers. Justice Anstead characterized the 
automobile exception as “a narrow, situation-dependent exception 
which requires much more than the fact that an automobile is the ob-
ject sought to be seized and searched.”133 To even trigger the “situa-
tion” mentioned by the Florida Supreme Court, two factors needed to 
exist: 1) “there must be probable cause to believe contraband is in the 
vehicle at the time of the search and seizure,” and 2) “there must be 
some legitimate concern that the automobile ‘might be removed and 
any evidence within it destroyed in the time a warrant could be ob-
tained.’”134 
 When applying this two-pronged rule, White v. State deemed the 
automobile exception to be “inapposite as authority,” for the case’s 
facts failed to clear the rule’s first hurdle, probable cause.135 Justice 
Anstead simply noted that “it is conceded that the government had 
no probable cause to believe that contraband was present in White’s 
car.”136 As for the Florida Supreme Court’s second requirement of 
exigent circumstances, Justice Anstead found it “obvious” that such 
facts were absent in the case.137 He opined: 
There simply was no concern presented here that an opportunity 
to seize evidence would be missed because of the mobility of the 
                                                                                                                  
 131. Judge Van Nortwick asserted, “Logically, for the same reasons, a motor vehicle 
may be seized under a forfeiture statute without a prior warrant.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the District Court further undermined the importance of its reference to the 
automobile exception by certifying the entire issue to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. 
 132. See White v. State, 710 So. 2d. 949, 951 (Fla. 1998). 
 133. Id. at 953. 
 134. Id. Justice Anstead also stated this test as follows: 
 The automobile exception is predicated upon the existence of exigent circum-
stances consisting of the known presence of contraband in the automobile at 
the time, combined with the likelihood that an opportunity to seize the contra-
band will be lost if it is not immediately seized because of the mobility of the 
automobile. 
Id. at 952. 
 135. Id. at 953. 
 136. Id. at 953. 
 137. Id.  
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vehicle. Indeed, the entire focus of the seizure here was to seize the 
vehicle itself as a prize because of its alleged prior use in illegal ac-
tivities, rather than to search the vehicle for contraband known to 
be therein, and that might be lost if not seized immediately.138 
 Having disposed of the automobile exception contention, the Court 
in White v. State then considered the argument which so persuaded 
the District Court of Appeal, that “since a defendant’s person can be 
seized without a warrant his property should be no different.”139 Jus-
tice Anstead recognized that such reasoning “simply proves too 
much.”140 Specifically, he noted: 
If we were to follow that reasoning to its logical conclusion we 
would, in essence, amend the Fourth Amendment out of the Con-
stitution and do away with the requirement of a warrant entirely 
for the search and seizure of property. It will always be more in-
trusive to seize a person than it will be to seize his property. That 
is the nature of human values. However, such an approach would 
apparently have us do away with the constitutional law of search 
and seizure as to property entirely, simply because we have per-
mitted the warrantless arrest of a person.141 
 Thus, although the First District Court of Appeal of Florida and 
the Florida Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions regarding 
the lawfulness of the seizure and search of White’s car, the judges 
authoring the conflicting opinions could indeed find common 
ground—White v. State was not a case which was easily answered by 
deeming police action to have fallen within the automobile exception. 
Judge Van Nortwick only cautiously analogized his case to the auto-
mobile exception precedent, while Justice Anstead refused to even go 
that far. The uniform hesitancy to broaden the automobile exception 
to fit the facts regarding White’s car would soon be overcome by the 
highest court in the land. 
C.   The Supreme Court’s Extension of the Automobile Exception to 
Seizing the Entire Car as “Contraband” 
 In White, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Thomas, politely chided the reader that, when in-
terpreting the Fourth Amendment, one must take care to “inquire 
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure 
when the Amendment was framed.”142 The White Court then went on 
to present an entire opinion without any independent examination of 
                                                                                                                  
 138. Id. at 954. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999). 
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the Framers’ intent. Instead, it delegated this task to Carroll, the 
original automobile exception case in which the Court labored 
through the details of legislation of the first Congresses to discern 
the Founders’ intent.143 White’s brief review of Carroll confirmed the 
Court’s distinction, in the “necessity for a search warrant,” between 
fixed structures and “movable” vessels which “readily could be put 
out of reach of a search warrant.”144 
 After the White Court’s short trip down memory lane, Justice 
Thomas considered the Florida Supreme Court’s refusal to expand 
the automobile exception to apply to the entire vehicle. White noted 
that the state supreme court had observed that “police lacked prob-
able cause to believe that respondent’s car contained contraband.”145 
Justice Thomas determined this was beside the point, for police “cer-
tainly had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was con-
traband under Florida law.”146  
 Interestingly, White then relied upon an exigency rationale to 
support the seizure of the entire car. Justice Thomas averred:  
Recognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband before 
it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early federal laws re-
lied upon in Carroll. . . . This need is equally weighty when the 
automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the 
police seek to secure.147 
This argument seemed strangely incongruous, given the Court’s flat 
ruling in the very same term in Dyson that exigency is simply not a 
requirement of the automobile exception.148 Thus, the Court trum-
peted exigency when it existed as a colorable argument in White, yet 
rejected it as an element of the automobile exception in Dyson when 
the facts failed to demonstrate any emergency circumstances. 
 As a fallback argument, White offered that law enforcement de-
served “greater latitude” in this seizure of a car, for it occurred in a 
“public place.”149 Here, Justice Thomas analogized to the Court’s ar-
rest cases. 150 In particular, the White Court offered as an example 
                                                                                                                  
 143. Justice Thomas noted: 
In Carroll, . . . [o]ur holding was rooted in federal law enforcement practice at 
the time of the ado ption of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we looked to 
laws of the First, Second, and Fourth Congresses that authorized federal offi-
cers to conduct warrantless searches of ships and to seize concealed goods sub-
ject to duties. 
Id. at 563-64. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 564-65. 
 146. Id. at 565. 
 147. Id. at 565 (citation omitted). 
 148. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 465 (1999). 
 149. White, 526 U.S. at 565. 
 150. See id. 
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United States v. Watson,151 which permitted “warrantless arrests in 
public places where an officer has probable cause to believe that a 
felony has occurred.”152 White then contrasted Watson with its war-
rant requirement for arrests in the home under Payton v. New 
York,153 explaining the distinction as between “a warrantless seizure 
in an open area and such a seizure on private premises.”154 The logic 
of the arrest cases would thus seem to distinguish between a seizure 
of a car in public and a seizure of the same vehicle in a private ga-
rage. Since White’s car was out in public, the Court was willing to ex-
tend to it Watson’s right of warrantless seizure. 
 Justice Thomas sought further support for White’s seizure from 
duty and tax cases. 155 Accordingly, the Court in White characterized 
its facts as “nearly indistinguishable from those in G.M. Leasing 
Corp. v. United States,”156 a case permitting a warrantless seizure of 
automobiles “in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments.”157 
Thus, much of the support for White’s dramatic expansion of the 
automobile exception cannot be traced directly to the original intent 
of the Framers or to automobile exception precedent. Instead, the 
very Court which exalted the consideration of law at the time of the 
framing158 reached out to such varied authorities as arrest of the per-
son and seizures to satisfy debts under the laws of duty and tax. 
V.   THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT’S REASONING IN WHITE 
A.   White’s Analytical Approach Has Potentially Begun an 
Unraveling of the Fourth Amendment Tapestry One Stitch at a Time 
 The White Court preoccupied itself with one dot on the Fourth 
Amendment canvas to the detriment of the individual’s privacy 
rights as a whole. If Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” were a 
grand tapestry, White would unravel it in its entirety simply by dog-
gedly tugging at a single thread. As will be discussed below, such 
narrow reasoning created an unprincipled reliance on labels and un-
dermined the traditional protections of the warrant preference. 
 However, before studying each of these concerns in turn, White’s 
reasoning must be assessed on its own merits. Were Justice Thomas’ 
arguments compelling on their own terms? The White opinion began 
its Fourth Amendment analysis by lauding the Carroll case for ad-
                                                                                                                  
 151. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  
 152. White, 526 U.S. at 565 (discussing the holding of Watson). 
 153. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  
 154. White, 526 U.S. at 566 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 587). 
 155. See id.  
 156. 453 U.S. 923 (1978). 
 157. White, 526 U.S. at 566. 
 158. See id. at 563. 
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hering to the Framers’ intent.159 However, White itself failed to learn 
the very lesson it touted in Carroll, for instead of pursuing an in-
depth analysis of what the Founders might have considered a rea-
sonable intrusion on a vehicle, White simply selected its favorite 
buzz-phrases from Carroll. Indeed, White’s treatment of Carroll mir-
rored its approach to the Fourth Amendment itself; Justice Thomas 
picked at particular parts of Carroll in isolation rather than 
considering the impact of this seminal automobile exception case as a 
whole. 
 A closer examination of Carroll calls into question several of Jus-
tice Thomas’ conclusions in White. Chief Justice William H. Taft, the 
author of the majority opinion in Carroll, carved out a narrow excep-
tion to the warrant requirement only after an extremely cautious and 
methodical analysis. The Chief Justice took the trouble to provide a 
detailed review of the legislative history of the federal statute at is-
sue160 and to study the enactments of the First, Second, and Fourth 
Congresses. 161 As Justice Thomas noted, Carroll’s meticulous ap-
proach did lead it to make a distinction in the “necessity for a search 
warrant between goods . . . concealed in a dwelling house” and those 
“in the course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel.”162 
 Yet, in a manner all too consistent with the Court’s myopic focus, 
the White Court ran with this conclusion without placing it within 
Carroll’s bigger picture. White’s rush to pick pieces of Carroll to sup-
port its narrow view caused the Court to miss the more fundamental 
point that the automobile exception was firmly founded upon the 
warrant requirement. In Carroll, Chief Justice Taft reaffirmed the 
Court’s warrant preference as a mandate: “In cases where the secur-
ing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.”163 Fur-
ther, to forgo a warrant, police had an extreme burden to establish 
probable cause: “In cases where seizure is impossible except without 
warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he 
can show the court probable cause.”164 Thus, unless circumstances 
made it impossible to obtain one, officers had to get a warrant. 
 Thus, as noted in Part II, the Court created the automobile excep-
tion out of the necessity that comes from using common sense. Police 
could skip a warrant to search an automobile in which they had 
probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. Otherwise, 
such searches could never be accomplished before the moving vehicle 
                                                                                                                  
 159. See id. at 564-65. 
 160. Further, Carroll’s analysis of the National Prohibition Act included extensive quo-
tation of the actual language provided in the law. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 143-47 (1925). 
 161. See id. at 150-51. 
 162. Id. at 151; see also White, 526 U.S. at 556. 
 163. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. 
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escaped the jurisdiction.165 Due to the exigency of inherent mobility, 
the automobile exception was born. 
 The White Court seemed to experience difficulty fitting the auto-
mobile exception’s exigency element into the bigger picture. Justice 
Thomas noted that “[r]ecognition of the need to seize readily movable 
contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early 
federal laws relied upon in Carroll.”166 Justice Thomas therefore 
chose to rely upon exigency in White. He offered the following reason-
ing: “This need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed 
to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure.”167 
White’s logic here deteriorated into a strained syllogism: 1) All cars 
are moveable and so must be searched immediately without warrant; 
2) in this case, we have a car; 3) and therefore, with the existence of 
this car, we have an exigency and can search without a warrant. 
 In offering such a rationale, the White Court failed to perceive a 
myriad of problems presented in the bigger picture. First, Justice 
Thomas’ “car creates exigency” contention simply did not square with 
the facts in the case. If the police in White were so concerned with 
time that they failed to get a warrant, why did they initially fail to 
seize Mr. White’s car for several months?168 When confronted with 
this gap in logic, the White Court was curiously unfazed. In fact, Jus-
tice Thomas could not be bothered with considering the issue of offi-
cial delay.169 He noted: 
At oral argument, respondent contended that the delay between 
the time that the police developed probable cause to seize the vehi-
cle and when the seizure actually occurred undercuts the argu-
ment that the warrantless seizure was necessary to prevent re-
spondent from removing the car out of the jurisdiction. We express 
no opinion about whether excessive delay prior to a seizure could 
render probable cause stale, and the seizure therefore unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment.170 
 The Court here treated official delay as affecting a collateral issue 
of the “staleness” of probable cause—whether a delay in action would 
undermine a police conclusion that the car was still subject to seizure 
under the forfeiture statute. This judicial tangent away from the cen-
tral issue of exigency, obtaining evidence before the car is allowed to 
leave the jurisdiction, to the secondary concern of the life span of 
probable cause, is curious. Since the Court itself has based the pro-
priety of the seizure not on whether the vehicle contained contra-
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band, but whether the car itself was seizeable contraband, staleness 
ceased to exist as a practical issue. After all, the police seized White’s 
car, not because they believed that it contained contraband, but be-
cause they believed that the car itself had become contraband, a 
status that would not change with the passage of time.171 
 Perhaps, in its footnoted retort to the respondent, White consid-
ered the nonissue of probable cause in part to obscure the real weak-
ness exposed by its “car creates exigency” rationale. The most glaring 
flaw in Justice Thomas’ exigency contention is the simple lack of ur-
gency. Justice Stevens recognized this in his dissent when he argued, 
“an exigent circumstance rationale is not available when the seizure 
is based upon a belief that the automobile may have been used at 
some time in the past to assist in illegal activity and the owner is al-
ready in custody.”172 The Florida Supreme Court, upon which Justice 
Stevens relied, was even more explicit: 
There simply was no concern presented here that an opportunity 
to seize evidence would be missed because of the mobility of the 
vehicle. Indeed, the entire focus of the seizure here was to seize the 
vehicle itself as a prize because of its alleged prior use in illegal ac-
tivities, rather than to search the vehicle for contraband known to 
be therein, and that might be lost if not seized immediately.173 
 Further, as previously noted in Part III, White’s “car creates exi-
gency” logic not only runs afoul of the case’s facts, but of the Court’s 
own law. In the same term that the Court decided White, it handed 
down Dyson, a case in which the Court held that the finding of prob-
able cause “alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.”174 Thus, Justice Thomas’ em-
phasis on exigency not only did not match the reality of the individ-
ual case, but it failed to consider the larger picture of Fourth 
Amendment case law that the Court itself had painted. 
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 The Court’s “car creates exigency” blunder was not an isolated 
event. White’s careless generalizations from random particulars bur-
dened the entire opinion. To bolster the seizure of White’s car from 
the parking lot, Justice Thomas noted that “our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has consistently accorded law enforcement officials 
greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places.”175 He then 
mentioned the distinction in the warrant requirement made between 
arrests in public and those in the home.176 However, close examina-
tion of the precedent upon which Justice Thomas relied, United 
States v. Watson177 and Payton v. New York,178 hardly support an ex-
pansion of warrantless public arrest to warrantless seizures of vehi-
cles on the street. 
 Watson, the case upholding law enforcement’s right to public ar-
rest without warrant, 179 hardly reached its conclusion in a manner 
consistent with White. Instead, Justice Byron White, authoring the 
Watson opinion, took great care to consider the law of arrest in the 
larger picture of history, state adjudication, and legal theory.180 He 
recognized that, for decades, the Court had construed the Fourth 
Amendment with an eye to ancient authority originating in Eng-
land.181 Watson concluded: 
 The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the 
ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to ar-
rest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in 
his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if 
there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.182 
 Unlike the White Court, the Watson Court backed up words extol-
ling the virtue of adhering to the Framers’ original intent with deeds. 
The Court in Watson emphasized: 
[I]t is important for present purposes to note that in 1792 Con-
gress invested United States marshals and their deputies with 
“the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as 
sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in 
executing the laws of their respective states.” The Second Congress 
thus saw no inconsistency between the Fourth Amendment and 
legislation giving United States marshals the same power as local 
peace officers to arrest for a felony without a warrant.183 
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 In its similar review of state law, the Watson Court quoted a mid-
nineteenth century case from Massachusetts, Rohan v. Sawin: “The 
authority of a constable, to arrest without warrant, in cases of felony, 
is most fully established by the elementary books, and adjudicated 
cases.”184 Since it was in the “elementary books,” warrantless arrest 
could hardly be considered a novel legal rule. This was shown by 
Watson’s recognition that authority to arrest without warrant “has 
also been the prevailing rule under state constitutions and stat-
utes.”185 
 Watson was still not content by its demonstration that war-
rantless public arrest was firmly embedded in common law, the 
Founders’ minds, and state rules. It continued its analysis by consid-
ering the work of the American Law Institute, which “undertook the 
task of formulating a model statute governing police powers and 
practice in criminal law enforcement and related aspects of pretrial 
procedure.”186 Here, even the American Law Institute, the law re-
formers who draft the model codes, chose to adhere to “the tradi-
tional and almost universal standard for arrest without a war-
rant.”187 
 Watson’s in-depth approach to arrest law not only shamed White 
for the manner in which it addressed the issue of warrantless seizure 
of vehicles, but, when read in connection with Payton, belied Justice 
Thomas’ inference that the Court allowed warrantless action merely 
because it occurred in public. A closer look at Payton reveals that 
White oversimplified its rule in order to rely upon Payton as support. 
 Justice Stevens, who authored Payton, placed arrests in the larger 
context of government intrusion.188 He deemed it “well settled” that 
when police officers see “objects such as weapons or contraband 
found in a public place” they may seize such items without a war-
rant, for “[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion 
of privacy and is presumptively reasonable.”189 However, the Payton 
Court considered it a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” 
that warrantless searches within a home were “presumptively un-
reasonable.”190 This was due to the increased interest in privacy that 
exists inside one’s home.191 The homeowner’s privacy rights were so 
powerful that they extended to the search of persons in their homes. 
Justice Stevens found the following reasoning persuasive: 
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[C]onstitutional protection afforded to the individual’s interest in 
the privacy of his own home is equally applicable to a warrantless 
entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of the house; for it is 
inherent in such an entry that a search for the suspect may be re-
quired before he can be apprehended.192 
 Thus, Payton made the distinction between arrests in public and 
those in a home based on the crucial criterion of privacy. The Payton 
Court was sufficiently sophisticated to understand that a seizure 
might not be an isolated event, but instead part of a larger intrusion 
that included a search. Rather than treating the arrest of a person 
and the search of that person as separate and independent events, 
Payton realized that, in an arrest at a home, the seizure and search 
intrusions were intertwined. Therefore, the Watson/Payton precedent 
did not simply apply the warrant requirement based upon whether or 
not police had a roof over their heads. These cases, when read to-
gether, limit seizures in the home because of the potential invasion 
they could have on the right of privacy. When the complete portrait 
painted by Watson and Payton is thus fully viewed, these cases actu-
ally point to a conclusion opposite that reached in White. Instead of 
allowing warrantless seizures of cars merely because these vehicles 
can be seen on a public street, Watson and Payton would restrict 
such actions if they would ultimately result in warrantless searches 
of the vehicles’ interiors. 
 The Divisionist painter Seurat understood that his artwork relied 
upon the viewer to consider the whole. In the most basic sense, he 
expected that those looking at his entire painting would allow their 
eyes to naturally combine a red dot with an yellow one in order to see 
orange. The Payton Court was likewise alert to the whole; it man-
dated a warrant for an arrest in a home because prior judicial ap-
proval was necessary to protect the privacy invaded in executing an 
arrest in a house. 
 To its credit, the White Court seemed to make an attempt, how-
ever clumsily, to connect the seizure power with its resulting privacy 
invasion. Justice Thomas explicitly noted the distinction between a 
seizure “in an open area and such a seizure on private premises.”193 
However, White went on to conclude “seizures of automobiles . . . on 
public streets, parking lots, or other open places, [does] not involve 
any invasion of privacy.”194 White’s consideration of the interplay of 
seizure and privacy caused it to look directly at a red dot and a yel-
low dot and still miss the resulting blend into orange. Justice Tho-
mas failed to see a privacy problem because he focused only on the 
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police seizure of White’s vehicle in “a public area—respondent’s em-
ployer’s parking lot.”195 The seizure of White’s car and the invasion of 
his privacy were indeed intertwined, but not because of the place 
where the car was located. Instead, the privacy invasion occurred 
during the later, and common, inventory search under South Dakota 
v. Opperman.196 Justice Thomas himself recognized as much when he 
noted that the seizure in White led to a “subsequent inventory 
search.”197 Justice Stevens was even more explicit: 
And a seizure supported only by the officer’s conclusion that at 
some time in the past there was probable cause to believe that the 
car was then being used illegally is especially intrusive when fol-
lowed by a routine and predictable inventory search—even though 
there may be no basis for believing the car then contains any con-
traband or other evidence of wrongdoing.198 
 Thus, the White Court identified as the relevant privacy invasion 
the police intrusion upon the location where the vehicle was parked, 
rather than the inventory search which routinely occurred with the 
impounding of a seized vehicle. White’s attention seems curiously 
misdirected. The search for a car in a typical garage would rarely be 
highly intrusive; where would an individual “hide” the car in the ga-
rage? In contrast to this relatively minimal intrusion, an inventory 
search of the interior of the vehicle itself can be quite probing, for 
people have been known to store all sorts of personal items in the 
compartments and containers of cars. In focusing on the stray speck 
of information regarding the vehicle’s location, the Court blinded it-
self to the larger invasion of the inventory search. 
 The White opinion therefore is not a model of internal consistency. 
Justice Thomas demanded inquiry into the Framers’ intent and then 
failed to independently perform such an assessment. 199 The Court in 
White promoted an exigency argument that was unsupported by the 
case’s facts and inconsistent with case law the Court itself had 
handed down in the very same term. 200 Furthermore, it relied on se-
lected passages of arrest precedent that failed to provide an analyti-
cal foundation for warrantless seizures of vehicles. 201 This piecemeal 
approach thus enabled the Court to expand the automobile exception 
at the cost of the bigger picture of Fourth Amendment fundamentals. 
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B.   The Court in White Promoted Label Logic 
 White not only honed-in on bits of search and seizure law at the 
cost of the overall picture of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it 
magnified the significance of various rules by stamping them with 
labels. The resulting label-logic wound up arguing too much. As 
much was alluded to even by the justices who concurred with the ma-
jority opinion.202 Justice Souter wrote separately in order to explicitly 
voice his reservation: 
I join the Court’s opinion subject to a qualification against reading 
our holding as a general endorsement of warrantless seizures of 
anything a State chooses to call “contraband,” whether or not the 
property happens to be in public when seized. The Fourth 
Amendment does not concede any talismanic significance to use of 
the term “contraband” whenever a legislature may resort to a 
novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as leg-
islatures are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing.203 
 Justice Souter’s assertion to the contrary cannot conceal the obvi-
ous danger in the White Court’s reasoning. The Court has resorted to 
label-logic, where a notion’s name has more importance than its ori-
gins in precedent or its implications for Fourth Amendment rights. 
In fact, Justice Souter may have stumbled upon the perfect metaphor 
in speaking of a talisman; to the majority in White, the legal category 
of “contraband” became a talisman—a thing “producing apparently 
magical or miraculous effects.”204 
 Now, when a state legislature speaks the sacred word “contra-
band,” the White Court would have all Fourth Amendment restric-
tions magically disappear. The incantation of “contraband” caused 
this very result in White, where the Florida legislature defined “con-
traband” to include any “vehicle of any kind, . . . which was used . . . 
as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting 
in the commission of, any felony.”205 The Court in White then used 
this legislative label to extend the automobile exception to include 
“the vehicle itself.”206 Thus, the critical fact that “there must be prob-
able cause to believe contraband is in the vehicle at the time of the 
search and seizure,”207 an element crafted by Carroll, simply disap-
peared. 
 The “car as contraband” formulation dramatically extended the 
potential reach of the government’s seizure powers. Traditionally, 
contraband has been understood to be objects so evil that their mere 
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production or possession constitutes criminality.208 Thus, the very 
dangerous nature of the property itself, whether it be counterfeit 
money, controlled substances, or illegal weapons, offered a common 
sense rationale for official seizure. These items were therefore unlaw-
ful to possess “regardless of purpose.”209 Automobiles hardly fit 
within a category of such a nefarious nature, for “’[t]here is nothing 
even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.’”210  
 Expanding “contraband” to include neutral items could have un-
fortunate collateral consequences in daily practice. In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens recognized the potential unfairness in the “state’s 
treatment of certain vehicles as ‘contraband’ based on past use.”211 He 
noted, “Unlike a search that is contemporaneous with an officer’s 
probable-cause determination, a belated seizure may involve a seri-
ous intrusion on the rights of innocent persons with no connection to 
the earlier offense.”212 Justice Stevens cited Bennis v. Michigan213 as 
support. 214 In Bennis, Tina Bennis lost her family car, which she her-
self had paid for, when her husband was caught performing a lewd 
act with a prostitute in the vehicle.215 The Supreme Court upheld 
Michigan’s forfeiture of the car despite Tina Bennis’ uncontested in-
nocence.216 In White, the Court’s unrestricted use of the “contraband” 
label risks similar troubles for those who lose vehicles in the Fourth 
Amendment context. 
C.   White Undermined the Warrant Preference 
 The Court which crafted the majority opinion in Carroll would 
hardly recognize either the current version of the warrant preference 
or its automobile exception to it. As noted in Part II.B., the Carroll 
Court strictly adhered to the mandates of the Warrant Clause, craft-
ing the automobile exception only after in-depth analysis convinced it 
that such a rule would not run counter to the Framers’ original in-
tent.217 Further, decades of litigation served to reinforce Carroll’s 
deference to the Warrant Clause. Nearly a half-century after Carroll, 
the Court accepted as its “most basic constitutional rule” in Fourth 
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Amendment law that “searches conducted outside the judicial proc-
ess, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”218 
 The warrant presumption has been so revered in the Court’s 
precedent that the White Court itself was leery to overtly reject it. 
However, as Justice Stevens noted, although White dared “not ex-
pressly disavow the warrant presumption,” its ruling “suggest[ed] 
that the exceptions have all but swallowed the general rule.”219 This 
was due to the fact that the White Court’s deeds spoke louder than 
its words. The White Court branded the case before it as one within 
the automobile exception despite the dearth of probable cause to be-
lieve the car contained any contraband220 and notwithstanding the 
police’s total lack of concern in the exigency of losing the vehicle from 
its jurisdiction.221 White’s invocation of the automobile exception was 
particularly brash; even the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
which ruled in the government’s favor, only ventured to say it was 
“influenced” by the fact that the evidence was found in a vehicle.222 
 Extending the automobile exception to include seizure of the vehi-
cle itself was especially unfortunate in White, for the circumstances 
of the case revealed exceptionally lax policing. For reasons known 
only to the officers involved, police failed to either arrest White or 
search his vehicle when they first learned of his drug sales from his 
car.223 Instead they waited over two months before arresting White 
on an entirely unrelated offense.224 At least, it is assumed it was 
some two months; due to its own carelessness, the government had to 
estimate this time by relying on information supplied by the defen-
dant.225 Such uncertainty about the timing hardly points to exi-
gency—rather, it appears that gaining access to White’s vehicle un-
der the automobile exception was not a law enforcement priority. 
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 It is hard to picture a case where police would have more leisure 
to obtain a warrant. The officers searching White’s car would be 
hard-pressed to offer details supporting any exigency preventing 
prior judicial approval. What is most striking however, is that the 
Florida officials did not even bother. As Justice Stevens noted, “the 
particularly troubling aspect of this case is not that the State pro-
vides a weak excuse for failing to obtain a warrant either before or 
after White’s arrest, but that it offers us no reason at all.”226 The facts 
demonstrate the drift the Court has suffered since its original forma-
tion of the automobile exception. Carroll has been so eroded that the 
concept of impossibility has been turned on its head. Once, police 
could act without a warrant only when the seizure with warrant 
would be impossible.227 Now, in White, the only impossibility pre-
sented involves the official explanation of delay—police cannot ex-
plain months of inaction, so they do not even bother making the at-
tempt. Therefore, when the Court in White chose to sanction this be-
havior with an extension of the automobile exception, it destroyed 
the practical impact of the traditional warrant preference. 
 Marginalizing the warrant requirement for government seizure of 
contraband is perilous, for the Court itself has recognized that the 
lure of gain may cloud official judgment. In a case apparently so clear 
that it did not require full briefing, the Court in Connally v. Geor-
gia228 expressed concern about the impact a monetary interest in a 
matter could have on government decisionmaking.229 In Connally, the 
Court reviewed a Georgia statute that provided a five dollar fee to 
the justice of the peace for every search warrant he or she issued.230 
The same justice of the peace, however, collected no fee for “review-
ing and denying” a search warrant application.231 The choice whether 
to grant or deny a warrant affected the “financial welfare” of the jus-
tice of the peace.232 The situation therefore offered “a possible temp-
tation to the average man as a judge . . . or which might lead him not 
to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the ac-
cused.”233 Since Georgia’s payment scheme undermined the neutral-
ity of the magistrate, Connally held that “the issuance of the search 
warrant . . . effected a violation of the protections afforded [the de-
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fendant] by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.”234 
 If Connally felt compelled to strike down a statute based on the 
corrupting effects of five dollars, it is curious that White failed to rec-
ognize the dangers inherent from seizing an entire car, potentially 
worth thousands of dollars. The amount of money at stake in White 
was not unique. The high finances involved in seizure matters is be-
lied by the cases’ very names: United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Cur-
rency,235 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,236 and One Lot 
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States.237 Thus, White’s 
logic would seem to indicate that five dollars could cause a member of 
the judiciary to compromise his principals, but cash, yachts, and pre-
cious gems would have no such effect on police.238 
 Finally, in ignoring the temptations that the powers of forfeiture 
offer to officials unrestricted by warrants, the Court made its most 
fundamental failure to consider the Framers’ intentions. The United 
States Constitution’s very structure is based on the Founders’ reali-
zation that officials cannot be trusted to avoid the temptations pro-
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vided by unchecked power.239 As noted in the Federalist Papers, the 
Framers divided the federal government into three branches, not out 
of blind trust of officialdom, but out of suspicion of it.240 Essentially, 
the Founders, in their pragmatism, knew that best way to check one 
official’s accumulation of power was to have others in government 
jealously guard their own power.241 Instead of ignoring human frail-
ties of character, the Framers employed them to limit the dangers of 
power. 
 In contrast to the sophisticated awareness of human nature dem-
onstrated by our Founders, the Court in White seemed strangely na-
ive. Justice Thomas was all too solicitous of state legislatures and lo-
cal police. Now, state governments can amend the automobile excep-
tion’s boundaries by statute; legislators are able to extend govern-
ment seizure power merely by expanding their definition of what 
constitutes “contraband.” Meanwhile, police on the beat are empow-
ered to make an on-the-scene determination as to what objects fall 
under the “contraband” label. Further, they may then act on their 
independent categorizations by seizing items that may end up filling 
department coffers. All of these actions, whether by the legislative or 
executive branches, can occur without bothering to seek approval 
from a single judge. One wonders whether the Framers, who Justice 
Thomas yearns to understand, would even recognize the debris re-
maining after White as the Fourth Amendment. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 When Georges Seurat painted Sunday on the Island of La Grande 
Jatte, he undertook a “difficult . . . disciplined and painstaking” 
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But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in 
the same department consists in giving to those who administer each depart-
ment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist en-
croachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all 
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with 
the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature 
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But 
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to gov-
ern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control 
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on 
the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience 
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
Id. 
 241. See id. 
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task.242 His meticulous system relied upon the viewer to stand back 
from his work “at the proper distance” so as to allow the minute spots 
of paint to combine into a sensible whole.243 Likewise, when the 
Founders crafted the Fourth Amendment, they created an all-
encompassing rule based upon a careful balancing of the variety of 
competing interests involved.244 The Framers meant for their audi-
ence to consider the Amendment as a whole, and not pick it apart 
piecemeal by obsessing on narrow labels such as “contraband” and 
“automobile exception.” 
 For all the effort Seurat put into his art, he could not ensure that 
his work would be viewed properly. White demonstrated that the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment suffer a similar limitation. For 
all their careful balancing, the Founders could not prevent the cur-
rent Court from choosing to favor one part of the Fourth Amendment 
litigation at the expense of the others. White’s failure to see the en-
tire portrait of the Fourth Amendment has the potential to enable 
the automobile exception to swallow the warrant preference. 
 Therefore, followers of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should 
be alert to potential developments. Despite its own protestations to 
the contrary, the Court seems ready to abandon fundamentals estab-
lished by the Founders. Moreover, the current members of the Court 
seem increasingly reliant upon label-logic. Also, the justices appear 
to be ever more willing to undermine the Court’s own warrant pref-
erence with ever-larger exceptions. Finally, the attentive observer 
might be alert to still one more observation: If the justices are seen to 
be on their way to the National Gallery of Art, look for Justice Tho-
mas to be headed for the Seurat exhibit with a magnifying glass. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 242. GARDENER HELEN, GARDNER’S ART THROUGH THE AGES, II RENAISSANCE AND 
MODERN ART 782 (7th ed. 1980). 
 243. The National Gallery of Art, supra note 1, at 1. 
 244. Justice Blackmun spoke of this balancing process in considering the warrant 
preference. He observed, “[T]he Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests 
involved and decided that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant 
based on probable cause.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (quoting U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983). 
